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ABSTRACT 
Both frequentist and Bayesian methodologies provides means for a 
statistical solution to a problem. However, it is usually the case that, 
for a given situation, one methodology is more appropriate. Using a number 
of oceanographic examples we explore the components of a statistical 
solution and illustrate the most appropriate methodology. Ve argue that 
the statistical consideration of utmost importance is the type of inference 
and conclusion to be made. In some examples it is more appropriate to make 
this inference as a Bayesian, and in some it is more appropriate to make 
this inference as a frequentist. 
"Still, it is an error to argue in front of your data. You find yourself insensibly twisting them round to 
fit your theories." 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Sherlock Holmes 
The Adventure of Visteria Lodge 
An alternate title for this paper might well be "Conditional and 
Unconditional Inference in Oceanographic Studies," as a fundamental 
difference between frequentist and Bayesian statistics is their resulting 
inference. A frequentist inference is unconditional, applying to a series 
of repeated experiments (most always an imagined series). In contrast, a 
Bayesian inference is conditional, applying to the data at hand, and not 
directly addressing the concept of repeatability. 
This paper is an introduction to these methods, and illustrates their 
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uses with some oceanographic data sets. The primary message is that each 
statistical view has a lot to offer, and, depending on the problem, one 
methodology is probably more appropriate. We illustrate this through the 
examples. 
A second goal of this paper is to try to explain to the oceanographic 
community how a statistician approaches a problem. The purpose of this 
endeavor is to provide a structured approach to dealing with problems 
involving data, from their inception to ending. In doing so, perhaps the 
task of dealing with the ever-increasing data bases can be made a little 
easier. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we 
give general outline of how to approach a problem statistically, 
illustrating this with an example in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the 
underlying differences between the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to 
statistics, and Sections 5 and 6 contain more examples illustrating these 
methodologies. Section 7 contains a concluding discussion. 
2. COMPONENTS OF A STATISTICAL SOLUTION 
In the best of all possible worlds, a problem is planned, 
statistically, from beginning to end. Chronologically, the steps of a 
solution can be listed as in Table 1. 
Table 1: Components of a Statistical Solution 
(Chronological Order) 
1. Model the Process 
2. Design the Experiment 
3. Collect the Data 
4. Esti.ate and Verify the Model 
5. Infer and Conclude 
6. lmple~rent the Solution 
Although the steps are performed in chronological order, they are 
best planned in reverse order. That is, when approaching any problem, the 
first consideration is "How will the knowledge we gain be implemented?" 
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For example, if a study is proposed to examine wave magnitude and direction 
in the North Atlantic, the first consideration should be the use of the 
resulting knowledge. Vill it be used to plan routes for oil tankers? Vill 
it be used to increase our basic knowledge of ocean dynamics? By answering 
this question first, the remainder of the steps of a statistical solution 
will fall into place, and the problem can be attacked in a very efficient 
fashion. Although this mechanism for solution is not usually taught in the 
classroom, it seems to be the one most preferred by statisticians. By 
concentrating on the final result, the entire study becomes focused. 
Vith respect to frequentism or Bayesianism, the components of the 
statistical solution remain essentially unchanged. Of course, there are 
some differences in the approaches, with the major difference being in the 
modeling and inference stages. However, the overall attack is similar. 
This is illustrated in the next sect:on. 
3. AN EXAMPLE CONCERNING ICEBERGS 
Defant (1961, page 278) presented the following data on the frequency 
of icebergs off Newfoundland. 
Table 2: Frequency of Icebergs off Newfoundland south 
(a) 
(b) 
of 48•N (a) and south of the Grand Banks (b), for 
the period 1900-1926. 
Month 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
3 10 36 83 130 68 
0 1 4 9 18 13 
25 13 9 
3 2 1 
4 3 
0 0 
2 
0 
386 
51 
For our example, we will look at the question of whether the yearly 
distribution of icebergs is the same in each location. A glance at 
Figure 1 will show that such a hypothesis is very likely, but for 
illustration we will step through both a Bayesian and frequentist 
approach to the problem. We take as the goal of our study to be the 
description of the distribution of icebergs off Newfoundland. 
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In both the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to this problem we 
assume that the data are distributed according to a multinomial 
distribution, and we wish to test the null hypothesis n0 : The 
distributions in locations {a) and {b) are the same. To test this as a 
frequentist we use a chi-squared test of association (see Snedecor and 
Cochran, 1989). The chi-squared test results in a p-value of .977, which 
is very strong evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. 
To perform a Bayesian analysis a prior distribution must be 
specified, that is, a distribution that ve subjectively believe describes 
the pattern of icebergs. Ve then use this distribution, in conjunction 
with the observed data, to assess the plausibility of the hypothesis. 
Since we really have no prior knowledge about the icebergs, ve use a 
strategy that attempts to model this ignorance, and calculate the 
probability of every data table vith the given marginal totals, using a 
hypergeometric distribution. This leads us to use Fisher's exact test 
{Fisher,1970) and assess the probability of the null hypothesis as .994. 
Again, this is very strong evidence in favor of this hypothesis. 
(Strictly speaking, Fisher's exact test is not a Bayesian procedure but a 
conditional procedure, as it is calculated conditionally on the observed 
data. However, the important feature is that it yields a conditional 
inference.) 
Ve now can clearly see the distinction betveen Bayesian and 
·frequentist inferences. The frequentist bases inference on a frequency 
·interpretation. A formal conclusion vould be of the form, "the 
statistical procedure used (here the chi-squared test) vould result in an 
erroneous inference less than 5% of the time in repeated experiments."" 
In contrast, the Bayesian inference is conditional on the observed data, 
and would formally conclude "based on the stated prior distribution and 
observed data, the probability is .994 that Ho is true." Ve now look at 
these differences a bit more closely. 
4. WHERE DOES THE RANDOMNESS COME FROM? 
The most important part of any statistical investigation is the 
resulting inference. In fact, it may even be said that the main reason 
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for doing a statistical investigation is to produce a meaningful 
inference, since the inference applies to a wider population than is 
actually studied and measured. (For example, after measuring the 
activities of a number of waves in a certain area, we are then interested 
in making a statement (an inference) about all waves in that area.) To 
make this inference we need an underlying model of the phenomena, one 
that accounts for the randomness of the observations and allows an 
inference. Bayesians and frequentists have different approaches to this. 
4.1 Frequency Randomness 
The frequentist assumes repeatability of the experiment, that the 
experiment actually performed is one of an infinitely long sequence of 
identical experiments. If we denote this sequence of experiments E1 , ~' 
... , Ek, Ek + 1 , ... , then we make our inference to the entire sequence, even 
though only one experiment (say Ek) is actually performed. The rest of 
this imagined-sequence builds the randomness into our model. Ve know 
that the results of each experiment (if performed) would be slightly 
different, and our inference will take these potential differences into 
account. 
Thus, the frequentist inference is an unconditional one that applies 
to the entire sequence, and does not single out the experiment actually 
performed. It is important to realize that the inference is about the 
performance of the procedure over the entire sequence of experiments, such 
as, "The statistical procedure used will be correct in 95% of all 
experiments performed." The actual outcome of the observed experiment 
will not change this inference. 
4.2 Bayesian Randomness 
In a Bayesian analysis the data are assumed to be fixed, and 
inference is made conditional on their observed values. Thus, no 
randomness comes from the data. The randomness in a Bayesian inference 
comes from the subjective prior distribution. This randomness, together 
with the information in the data, are combined into the posterior 
distribution. The posterior distribution is then used for inference. Of 
course, different subjective prior distributions may result in different 
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inferences. 
More precisely, suppose there are data, X, which vary according to a 
probability distribution f(xiO), a distribution indexed by an unknown 
parameter 0. (For example f(· IO) may be a Gaussian distribution with 
unknown mean 0.) We then assume that the parameter 8 varies according to 
a prior distribution ~(0). This probability distribution reflects our 
knowledge about the parameter 0 before observing the new data x. (In 
keeping with convention, an upper case X denotes an unseen random 
variable while a lower case x denotes an observed value. Thus the 
equation "X= x" means that we have observed the value x of the random 
variable X.) Using the laws of probability (or sometimes called Bayes 
rule) we calculate the posterior distribution of 0 given X=x, g(Ojx), as 
g(Oix) = f(xj8)1r(O) 
where the integral is over all values of 0. (For more detail on such 
calculations, see Casella and Berger, 1990.) Our inference is then based 
on g(Ojx), which only considers the experiment actually performed, not 
any repeated sequence. For example, one might infer "Based on the 
specified 1r(O) and observed x, we conclude that 8 ~ 0 vi th probability 
95%." This inference would follow if it were the case that 
J()g(O I x)dO = .95. 
4.3 The Appropriate Inference 
As mentioned before, the purpose of this paper is not to make value 
judgments as to which of Bayesianism or frequentism is better. Rather, 
the purpose is to illustrate situations where one method is more 
appropriate. It then follows that the more appropriate methodology, and 
inference, is the one to use. From the previous two subsections, we see 
that the frequentist inference is more appropriate if repeatability is 
important, while the Bayesian inference is more appropriate if the 
inference is to be made conditional on the observed data. Returning to 
the iceberg data, it seems that the Bayesian inference is more 
appropriate, as we are faced with a data set that is unrepeatable, and we 
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are interested in an inference conditional on that data set. 
(Interestingly, it was argued during discussions at the workshop that one 
could consider the observed 26-year period as one of a sequence of 26-
year periods, in which case the frequentist inference maybe more 
appropriate.) If it may be argued that either interpretation is valid, 
and hence either inference is appropriate, there is no problem. As long 
as the methodology is chosen to appropriately answer the question of 
interest, phrased in the manner of interest, the statistics have served 
their purpose. 
5. AN EXAMPLE CONCERNING BREAKING WAVES 
Hwang, Hsu and Wu (1990) report on an experiment concerning average 
height of breaking waves, H8 , measured as a function of RMS surface 
displacement, q. The data are presented in F;gure 2. They conclude that 
H8 < H8 , the significant wave height, where Hg = 4q, and state, "In a 
random wave field, waves that break due to local instabilities are not 
necessarily the highest waves." Statistically, we can think of this as 
testing the hypotheses 
vs. 
It seems here that frequency considerations are important, in that 
-conclusions should apply to repetitions of the experiment. This concern 
.seems implicit in the above quoted conclusion of Hwang et al. Thus, a 
frequentist analysis is more appropriate. Using a standard linear 
regression model with Gaussian errors, we obtain a p-value of .999 for 
the hypothesis H0 : HB ::5 4q, showing that there is overwhelming evidence 
to support this hypothesis. (In fact, the hypothesis H0 : H8 ::53q yields 
a p-value of .911, demonstrating extremely good support for this even 
stronger claim.) 
Of course, a Bayesian analysis could also be performed, but the 
inference would not apply to a sequence of experiments. The conclusions 
would be conditional on the observed data. To do the Bayesian analysis 
we again use a standard linear regression model with Gaussian errors, but 
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we also assume that HB=b7], where b is a parameter with a specified prior 
distribution. We specify the prior to also be Gaussian, and we take the 
prior mean to be equal to the hypothesized value. (Thus, for testing H0 : 
HB ~ 47] we specify a Gaussian prior with mean 4. This strategy of 
centering the prior at the hypothesized value gives equal prior weight 
above and below the value, and may be considered an impartial prior 
specification.) 
Combining our prior specification with the observed data, we 
calculate Pr(b~4ldata) = .999 and Pr(b~3ldata) = .623. That is, for the 
specified priors and conditional on the observed data, b is less than 4 
with probability .999 and less than 3 with probability .623. 
Quantitatively, these conclusions are similar to those of the 
frequentist, and show overwhelming support for the null hypotheses. The 
only difference is in the scope of the inference. 
Bayesian conclusions are, of course, dependent on the prior 
specification, and sometimes there might be concern about oversensitivity 
to this specification. Such a concern is easily addressed, however, by 
calculating posterior probabilities over a range of prior specifications. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3, where we display the posterior 
probabilities over a wide range of standard deviations. (The standard 
deviation of the data is .082, and the graph shows the prior standard 
deviation up to twice this value.) The figure shows that, for this range 
·of prior standard deviations, the conclusions from the Bayesian analysis 
are relatively stable in their support of H0 • 
6. AN EXAMPLE CONCERNING BUBBLE POPULATIONS 
The distribution of bubble populations is also investigated by Hwang, 
et al. (1990). They collected data on bubble populations as a function 
of depth and wind velocity, as presented in Figure 4. For a given depth, 
Z, (em) and wind velocity, u, (m/s), the logarithm of the bubble 
population, N(Z), (log cm3) is modeled as 
u=10, 11, ... , 15 
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where £ represents random error, and is assumed to have Gaussian 
distribution with mean 0 and variance u2 . 
A question of interest is whether the distribution of bubbles is the 
same at each depth. After some thought, it seems that the appropriate 
inference here is the frequentist inference. Concern about the 
repeatability of the inference leads to this conclusion, as we would like 
to be able to describe the bubble populations at a given depth and wind 
velocity when such conditions are again realized. 
6.1 A Standard Frequentist Inference 
A standard approach to this problem is to decide if the slopes are 
the same at each wind velocity, so we would test the null hypothesis H0 : 
b10 = b11 = ... = b15 . Doing so leads to a p-value of .063, which suggests 
rejection of H0 . Thus a standard frequentist analysis would lead us to 
fit separate regression lines for each wind velocity. So for each wind 
velocity we would use a separate regression equation to predict the 
bubble population. See Table 3 and Figure 5. 
6.2 An Empirical Bayes Analysis 
The bubble population data is ideal for an empirical Bayes analysis-a 
mixture of frequency and Bayesian analyses that combines the best 
features of each. Here we will only briefly explain the methodology, for 
a more detailed introduction see the articles by Casella (1985, 1992). 
Table 3: Coefficients for the standard regression analysis 
(frequentist) and empirical Bayes analyses of 
the bubble populations. 
Wind empirical 
Velocity n intercept slope std. dev. Bayes slope 
10 4 .666 -.084 .011 -.076 
11 5 .924 -.040 .013 -.042 
12 4 1.594 -.080 .008 -.073 
13 5 1.669 - .050 .017 -.050 
14 4 1.698 - .031 .029 -.035 
15 4 1.635 - .0009 .027 - .011 
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To perform an empirical Bayes analysis we start with the frequentist 
model and inference structure. Ve append a Bayes model to the slopes 
bu""Gaussian (b, .,.2) , u=10, 11, ••• , 15, 
that is, that the slopes come from a common Gaussian population with 
unknown mean band variance T2 • 
The "empirical" part of empirical Bayesian is to now estimate these 
unknown parameters b and T2 from the data. (A standard Bayesian analysis 
would specify values for these parameters.) Using these estimated values 
allows the data to assess the tenability of the submodel, that the bu' s 
come from a common population. The empirical Bayes slope estimates are a 
convex combination of the common overall slope (-.048) and the individual 
least squares slopes, given by 
empirical Bayes= ( •221 )( _ •048) + (. 779)(least squares). 
slope slope 
'l'he weighting factor .221 (and • 779 = 1- .221) are data based estimates. 
The empirical Bayes slope estimates are valid under the model of 
frequentist repeatability. In fact, they are superior to the frequentist 
estimates using a criterion of expected mean squared error. Thus, on the 
average, the empirical Bayes estimates will be closer to the true values 
.than the standard frequentist estimates. They combine the best features 
of Bayesian modeling and frequentist inference. 
Figure 5 also shows the empirical Bayes regression lines. Although 
they are not very different from the standard frequentist lines, they do 
display a movement toward the common slope value. The empirical Bayes 
analysis has uncovered a small amount of common structure, and has used 
this in improving each of the estimates. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The statistical methodology to be used, whether Bayesian or 
frequentist, should be selected according to the type of inference that 
is desired (and is appropriate). The frequentist methodology is 
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appropriate for inference over a series of repeated experiments, while 
the Bayesian methodology is appropriate for inference specific to the 
experiment that was done. This article has given examples and provided 
discussion of situations where each methodology is appropriate. 
There is no brick wall between Bayesianism and frequentism. The 
methodologies are not at odds with one another, they are complementary to 
one another. When approaching a statistical problem ~opportunism" is 
best. With that in mind, the appropriate analysis and inference can be 
chosen from all available statistical methodologies. 
Both Bayesianism and frequentism are built on a set of assumptions, 
some more palatable than others. For a user of frequentist methods, 
perhaps the assumption most difficult to believe is that the process 
(including parameter values) remains constant over the imagined series of 
experiments. For user of Bayesian methods, perhaps the assumption most 
difficult to believe is that the prior distribution is correct. These 
assumptions, however, can sometimes be checked and and maybe even 
relaxed. Moreover, their reasonableness in any particular situation may 
also form a basis for choosing an appropriate methodology. (See Berger 
1985, who discusses robust Bayesian analysis, which addresses these 
concerns). Lastly, there is an enormous amount of research being done in 
statistics, and some of it is aimed at relaxing these assumptions. Such 
research has already given us techniques like empirical Bayes analysis, a 
synthesis of both Bayesian and frequentist methodologies which can often 
'provide superior solutions. 
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Figure 1: Relative frequencies of icebergs off (a) Newfoundland (black 
squares) and (b) Grand Banks (white squares). 
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Figure 2: Averaged height of breaking waves, n8 , as a function of RMS 
water surface displacement, q. The line shown is the least 
squares line, with equation H8 =.102+2.89q (r2 =.994). 
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Figure 3: Posterior probabilities for the null hypotheses H0 :b$4 (solid 
lines) and H0 : b $ 3 (dashed lines), as a function of the prior 
standard deviation. 
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Figure 4: 
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Data from Hwang et al. (1990) on bubble populations. The six 
groups are each at a different wind velocity, from 10 to 15 
m/s in steps of 1. The groups are in order from 10 m/s 
(lowest) to 15 m/s (highest), and are denoted by black squares 
(10 m/s), white squares (11 m/s), black diamonds (12 m/s), 
white diamonds (13 m/s), black triangles (14 m/s) and white 
triangles (15 m/s). The data are connected merely to aid 
viewing. 
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Figure 5: Standard frequentist (solid lines) and empirical Bayes (dashed 
lines) fits to the bubble data, coded as in Figure 4. The 
empirical Bayes lines (whose slopes are pulled toward -.048) 
are under the least squares lines for 11, 14 and 15 mfs, and 
above the least squares lines for 10 and 12 mfs. The lines 
are virtually identical for 13 mfs. 
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